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[The public good] justifies the use of language to 
bring about a common sense. –Loïc Nicolas, 2011  
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Introduction 
This paper is built on a theoretical foundation that draws close 
connections between rhetoric and technology. These relationships 
go beyond the observation that Aristotle considered rhetoric to be a 
technê (art) (Arist. Rhet. 1.1.). Rather, rhetoric and technology are 
similar in the fact that both do things in the world. I am specifically 
interested in how rhetoric and technology both rely on and 
potentially contribute to what can be seen as ‘common sense.’ In the 
pages that follow, I investigate several sites of change between 
classical and modern rhetoric, focusing on differences involving the 
concept of common sense (endoxa) in Aristotle. I argue that there 
are loci of change that mark the shift from the classical sense of 
endoxa as a rhetorical device to the recognition made by many 
modern rhetoricians that the truth is largely what we make of it.  
It is worth noting at the outset that this clear-cut distinction 
between classical and modern rhetoric rests on somewhat shaky 
ground, as Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede make clear (Lunsford and 
Ede 1984). Lunsford and Ede cast doubt upon a commonly accepted 
dichotomy between classical (and especially Aristotelian) rhetoric 
and the modern rhetoric that began to emerge in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and came into its own in the twentieth 
(Lunsford and Ede 1984, 37-40). As Lunsford and Ede describe it, 
this dichotomy has rested on the notion that Aristotle viewed man 
as an animal motivated by reason, antagonistic only in his desire to 
persuade his audience.  By way of contrast, modern rhetoric has 
been characterized by viewing people as symbol-using animals, 
motivated by emotion and psychological proofs, with a rhetor-
audience relationship that is aimed at dialog and communication 
(40).  Lunsford and Ede argue convincingly that this dichotomy 
relies on an oversimplified reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric isolated 
from his other texts. However, Lunsford and Ede also make clear 
that there are several key differences between Aristotle’s rhetoric 
and texts that draw from it, such as The New Rhetoric by Chaïm 
Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca.   
One of these differences is found in the ways these respective 
rhetorics rely on epistemology:  
 
Rhetoric uses thought and language to lead to judgment 
(krisis) as the basis of action in matters of this world. 
And for Aristotle, that world of contingent reality, 
though itself in a state of flux, could be understood by 
systematic application of the intellect because that 
reality itself was thought to be informed by stable first 
principles. 
Modern rhetorical theory rests on no such fully confident 
epistemology, nor does knowledge enjoy such a clearly 
defined status. ...  Hence, for the modern period, 
connections among thought, language, and reality are 
thought to be grounded not in an independent, chartable 
reality but in the nature of the knower instead (Lunsford 
and Ede 1984, 47). 
In other words one key difference between Aristotelian and modern 
rhetorics is the amount of weight their respective epistemologies 
can bear.  
Lunsford and Ede go on to note another distinction between 
classical and modern rhetoric: Modern rhetoric does not have the 
kind of “fully articulated theory” that Aristotle was able to offer in 
The Rhetoric. Instead, we rhetoricians of the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries have relied on a multiplicity of theories, each working 
to reveal a small piece of the relationships about thought, 
knowledge, and language (47). One purpose of this paper is to 
investigate how technology factors into these relationships.  
As such, I locate five sites of change that help shift from a 
classical epistemology to a modern one.1 These sites of change can 
be found in 1) arguments based on loci of quantity, 2) 
1 By “modern” I mean simply a rhetorical system that recognizes the 
dependence that knowledge has on the knower, as articulated by Lunsford 
and Ede above.  
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enthymematic arguments, 3) modern understandings of the 
relationship between common sense and truth, 4) Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience, and 5) the philosophical 
concept of social imaginaries. My purpose is to tease out differences 
among these closely related rhetorical and philosophical concepts 
in order to shed light on their normative implications. “Common 
sense” influences the ways in which we see ourselves fitting into the 
world, as philosopher Charles Taylor points out (Charles Taylor 
2002, 2004). Taylor offers the theoretical construct of “social 
imaginaries” to help describe the ways in which participants in a 
society shape and are shaped by the social structures around them. 
Insofar as these interactions are rhetorical, I see them as similar to 
the kinds of rhetoric that undergird Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s concept of communion but as different in important ways 
from Aristotle’s endoxa. 
However, technology itself can be profoundly disruptive of 
common sense. In the second half of this article, I will demonstrate 
how the confrontation between technology and common sense 
differs between Aristotle’s rhetorical theory and modern (especially 
twentieth century) rhetorical theory. One result of this conflict can 
be seen when technological change gives birth to new forms of 
common sense. As I will show in the final section below, this 
process becomes most clear if technology itself is seen through a 
critical lens. Andrew Feenburg’s critical theory of technology offers 
just such a lens to focus on this process (Feenburg 2002). However, 
I also argue that rhetorical theory provides an opportunity to 
deepen the critical theory of technology offered by Feenberg.  
Aristotle: Rhetoric, Endoxa, and Truth 
Before beginning the main part of this article, it is worth reviewing 
some of Aristotle’s fundamental ideas about rhetoric. I begin with 
this oft-cited passage from On Rhetoric: “Rhetoric may be defined 
as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion” (Rhet. 1.2.1355b27-8). Aristotle considered rhetoric to 
be related to dialectic.  However, it is clear that dialectic served a 
much more important role in Aristotle’s mind; it could lead to 
knowledge (epistēmē) whereas rhetoric leads to persuasion (pistis). 
What’s more, Aristotle makes a distinction between those kinds of 
rhetoric that draw on knowledge and those that are based on 
opinion: “For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, 
and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we 
must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions 
possessed by everybody [that is, endoxa]” (Rhet. 1.1. 1345a26-8). 
Later in this article I will discuss the relationship that Aristotle 
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sketches out between endoxa and the rhetorical device of 
enthymeme. For now it is sufficient to acknowledge that for 
Aristotle truth remained well outside the purview of rhetoric even 
though enthymeme and endoxa must draw on truth (or what seems 
to be true) in order to be persuasive. Thus, for Aristotle dialectic is 
an essential methodology that can be drawn on in the hopes of 
discovering truths, whereas rhetoric is at best a technique used to 
persuade.  
Endoxa can be thought of simply as commonly held opinions, as 
Aristotle puts it in The Topics: 
In the case of scientific principles, there is no need to 
seek the answer of why but each of the first principles is 
persuasive in and of itself. Generally accepted opinions 
[endoxa], on the other hand are those that seem right to 
all people or most people or the wise (Arist. Topics 
1.1.100b18).  
Further, Aristotle sees in humans an innate ability to find endoxa 
that are more or less true:  
For the true and the approximately true are 
apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted 
that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is 
true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man 
who makes a good guess at the truth is likely to make a 
good guess at what is reputable [that is, at endoxa] (Rhet 
1.1.1355a14-18). 
This makes it clear that although “rhetoric is the counterpart of 
dialectic” (Rhet.1.1.1354a1), Aristotle’s vision of rhetoric is largely 
concerned with persuasion. At best rhetoric should attempt to rely 
on truth to persuade audiences to act in accordance with truth.  
 Rhetoricians since at least the twentieth century have 
found the line between opinion and truth to be much less distinct. 
Without going so far as to claim the non-existence of the material 
world, theorists such as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have found 
truth to be more the product of human communication and rhetoric 
than Aristotle likely would have allowed. Indeed, Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca see their project as taking up this thread: “Here is 
resumed the age-old debate between those who stand for truth and 
those who stand for opinion, between philosophers seeking the 
absolute and rhetors involved in action” (27). This debate in turn 
leads them to a “distinction between persuading and convincing” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 27).  In other words, where-
as Aristotle saw Truth as something that the rhetorician must lean 
Joshua Welsh 4 Poroi 10,1 (January 2014) 
on in order to persuade, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca draw a 
close connection between generally held opinion and those things 
that are eventually held to be true.  
Locus 1: Loci of quantity 
Loci of quantity provide the first place to look for a change in the 
relationship between rhetoric and the truth found in common 
sense. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, loci of 
quantity provide a connective tissue binding opinion and truth. 
Simply put, an argument resting on a locus of quantity relies on the 
power of numbers to be persuasive—that is, something that is good 
for many is generally thought to be persuasive to all. Indeed, 
Aristotle himself considered loci of quantity in Topics, as Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca point out: “Aristotle mentions some of these 
loci: a greater number of good things is more desirable than a 
smaller” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 85). Indeed, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that these kinds of proofs lie 
at the heart of many modern notions of self-rule and even what 
comes to be counted as “truth” itself:  
A locus of quantity, the superiority of that which is 
accepted by the greater number of people, forms the 
basis of certain conceptions of democracy and also 
conceptions of reason which equate reason with 
‘common sense.’ Even which certain philosophers such 
as Plato contrast truth when the opinion of the greater 
number, it is by means of a locus of quantity that they 
justify the preference they accord to truth, for they hold 
it to be something commanding the assent of all the 
gods, something which should win the assent of all men 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 86–7).  
Regarding the relationship between loci of quantity and truth, 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca point to the notion of durability 
(which is quantitatively based on the amount of time something will 
last): “The quantitative locus of durability justifies also the high 
values attached to truth as being that which is eternal in contrast to 
opinions, which are passing and unstable” (87). Contrast this with 
Descartes, who viewed “good sense” as “the power of judging aright 
and of distinguishing truth from error” (Descartes 1994, 3). 
Descartes saw good sense, or reason, as being distributed in equal 
shares among all people. The reason people disagree is not that 
some people have more reason than others, but that “We conduct 
our thoughts along different ways and do not fix our attention on 
the same objects” (Descartes 1994, 3). Implicit in this view of 
reason is the assumption that truth itself lies outside of the ways in 
Joshua Welsh 5 Poroi 10,1 (January 2014) 
which we reason about it. Some of us may find truth by using 
reason well; others may not. But Truth itself is always external to 
the seeker.  
Unlike Aristotle and Descartes, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
maintain that truth is not external to rhetoric—instead they place 
truth directly in the hands of the rhetor. In other words, to be 
considered true a thing need only be thought of as true by the 
greatest number of people for the greatest amount of time. Rhetors 
concerned with opinion are therefore directly involved in crafting 
what comes to be held as true.2 
Of course, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were not the first 
scholars to question the notions of an external Truth. To take one 
eighteenth-century example, Giambattista Vico critiqued the 
Cartesian methods of inquiry that were prevalent in his time, 
arguing that an over-reliance on these methods had led to a neglect 
of ethics and rhetoric: 
Since, in our time, the only target of our intellectual 
endeavors is truth, we devote all our efforts to the 
investigation of physical phenomena, because their 
nature seems unambiguous; but we fail to inquire into 
human nature which, because of the freedom of man’s 
will, is difficult to determine (Vico 1990, 720).  
Vico’s solution, at least for those interested in political topics and 
human affairs, was to forgo the study of nature for the study of 
debate and rhetoric.  
Michel Foucault takes a similar tack in his description of the role 
that language plays as part of the epistemic warehouse: “All 
knowledge is rooted in a life, a society, and a language that have a 
history, and it is in that very history that knowledge finds the 
element enabling it to communicate with other forms of life” 
(Foucault 1970, 372). According to Foucault, as also Vico, 
language’s role in the epistemic warehouse is rooted in custom and 
the human mind: 
Having become a dense and consistent historical reality, 
language forms the locus of tradition, of the unspoken 
habits of thought, of what lies hidden in a people’s mind; 
2 This should come as no great surprise to readers of modern rhetoric, 
especially work that has been done in the past three decades on the 
rhetoric of science. Gross (1990) and Latour & Woolgar (1986) are 
excellent examples. 
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it accumulates an ineluctable memory which does not 
even know itself as a memory (Foucault 1970, 297).  
Setting aside the Foucauldian mystery of how language could 
involve itself in “unspoken habits of thought,” the key insight is 
clear. In fact, it is reminiscent of an observation offered by Lewis 
Mumford that the mind is something different from the brain, and 
quite impossible without language (Mumford 1967, Chapter 2). The 
crux of Foucault’s project in The Order of Things is to explain how 
rhetorical changes have impacted that epistemic warehouse. 
Foucault claims that before the modern era, language and 
knowledge were centered on categorizing and taxonomies. Indeed, 
Foucault insightfully points out that categories rely on the natural 
ambiguity of language, since a perfect one-to-one naming system 
would be completely meaningless. In other words, language is not 
simply about naming things; language concerns itself with putting 
like with like and thereby attempting to understand differences 
(Foucault 1970, 96–103). However, Foucault argues that during the 
modern era, language (and consequently knowledge) moved from 
taxonomies to grids: “The centre of knowledge in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries is in the table” (75). This reflects changes 
in writing and even printing technologies; it is easier to 
communicate using grids and tables if these devices can be 
reproduced consistently. In essence, these rhetorical changes 
impact the nature of knowledge itself—changes in language and 
writing affect the way that knowledge is discovered, understood, 
created, and transferred.  
Locus 2: Enthymeme 
A second locus of change between ancient and modern rhetoric as 
they bear on in the relationship between rhetoric and common 
sense can be found in shifting understandings of enthymeme. 
Enthymeme, at its core, is a rhetorical argument in which one or 
more premises or the conclusion has been left unstated. 3 The 
classic example of enthymeme is as follows: 
3 Some scholars have rightly cast doubt on this tidy, long-standing 
definition. M. F. Burnyeat, for example, argues that Aristotle did not 
intend for the definition of enthymeme to be so heavily pinned to 
whether premises are explicit or implied. Instead Burnyeat contends that 
Aristotle saw enthymeme and rhetorical syllogism—which he 
distinguished from the logical syllogism—as much the same thing (as the 
citation from Rhet 1.1.1355a shows). The difference between rhetorical 
syllogism (or enthymeme) and logical syllogism can be found not in their 
nature of their premises but instead in their contexts (Burnyeat 1996, 
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1) Socrates is a man.  
2) Therefore Socrates is mortal.  
In this example, the unstated premise is “All men are mortal.” 
Aristotle offers the enthymeme as one way to connect arguments 
with endoxa:  
It is clear, then that the technical study of rhetoric is 
concerned with the modes of persuasion. Now 
persuasion is sort of demonstration (since we are most 
fully persuaded when we consider a thing to have been 
demonstrated); the orator’s demonstration is an 
enthymeme, [and this, in general, the most effective of 
the modes of persuasion]; the enthymeme is a sort of 
deduction … : clearly, then, he who is best able to see 
how and from what elements a deduction is produced 
will also be best skilled in the enthymeme, when he has 
further learnt what its subject-matter is and in what 
respects it differs from the deductions of logic. For the 
true and the approximately true are apprehended by the 
same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a 
sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do 
arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good 
guess at the truth is likely to make a good guess at what 
is reputable (Rhet 1.1.1355a4-18). 
For Aristotle, there is a clear relationship between enthymeme and 
endoxa: Endoxa are the source of the terms connecting 
enthymematic premises and conclusions. However even when 
dealing with enthymeme, Aristotle remains focused on truth as the 
most important ingredient in persuasion: “True and better ones 
[i.e., underlying facts] are by nature always more productive of 
good syllogisms [and by extension, good enthymemes] and, in a 
word, more persuasive” (Rhetoric 1355a12). Without access to the 
truth, the rhetor (as far as Aristotle is concerned) does not have 
much hope of being persuasive. In other words, for Aristotle, know-
ing the truth can help reveal more persuasive enthymemes, but not 
the other way around.  
 Lloyd Bitzer sheds light on the relationship between 
commonly held opinion and enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
while strengthening the connection between dialectic and rhetoric 
itself (Bitzer 1959, 399-408). He surveys previous definitions of en-
thymeme and finds most of them lacking in one way or another. But 
98). Burnyeat makes it clear that rhetorical and dialectic arguments 
(whether they be labeled as enthymemes or syllogisms) are both 
dependent on endoxa for their premises.  
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building from these definitions and from the Rhetoric itself, he 
finds that definitions of enthymeme generally see it as something 
akin to a syllogism that deals with probabilities or signs while at the 
same time leaving some part of the argument unstated. Bitzer 
implies in his own definition that it is the unstated portion of the 
argument that gives rhetorical enthymeme its persuasive power: 
“The enthymeme is a syllogism based on probabilities, signs, and 
examples, whose function is rhetorical persuasion. Its successful 
construction is accomplished through the joint efforts of speaker 
and audience, and this is its essential character” (Bitzer, 1959, 408). 
In other words, the unstated premises in an enthymeme are similar 
to the questions used in dialectic: both allow the audience to fill in 
crucial parts of the interaction based on their own opinions and 
beliefs. This has become especially important as rhetoric has moved 
from oratory into writing. However, Douglas Walton, far from 
seeing this as a strength of enthymeme, considers it to be “the 
problem with enthymemes”:  
If given carte blanche to fill in any proposition needed to 
make the inference structurally correct, we may insert 
assumptions…that the speaker or audience didn’t realize 
were there, doesn’t accept, or didn’t even mean to be part 
of the argument (Walton 2001, 94).  
Nevertheless, Walton offers his own description of the way 
enthymeme often functions in rhetoric: “In rhetorical persuasion, it 
seems that eikotic or plausibilistic arguments are frequently 
combined with arguments that have nonexplicit premises or 
conclusions” (99).  
After analyzing a number of enthymematic arguments, Walton 
helps shed light on the connection between enthymeme and eikos 
or probability: 
A common basis for many of the enthymemes above is 
found in propositions that are relied on as acceptable 
assumptions that need not be explicitly stated because 
they can be taken for granted as holding on the basis of 
common experience, or common understanding of the 
way things normally work in familiar situations (Walton 
2001, 104).4 
4 As an example, Walton also offers the following argument: “Rise e 
bise (rice and peas) is often listed on menus among the soups, and some 
gastronomic writers dare to call it one. Nonsense! It is served with a fork. 
Who ever heard of eating soup with fork?” (Walton 2001, 102, citing Root 
1990). Walton breaks down the enthymeme in this example more quite 
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In other words, enthymemes need not explicitly state those 
premises that are anchored in common sense. They are already 
there, in the spirit (en-thumos). It is this reliance on common sense 
and the relationship between common sense and commonly held 
opinion (that is, between enthymeme and endoxa) that interests 
me, especially as both concepts become anchored in technological 
choices. In the following section, I attempt to make clear some 
connections between common sense and rhetorical facts and truths. 
Locus 3: Common Sense, Facts, and the Truth 
A third place where modernist rhetoric has shifted towards the 
epistemic can be found in the relationship among common sense, 
facts, and truth. It is just here that technology comes on stage. This 
is important to an understanding of how rhetoric in turn shapes 
technology because of the tendency that successful technologies 
have of becoming ubiquitous—and then invisible. Our understand-
ing of technological progress becomes interwoven with our 
understanding of the way things are. Historical choices that have 
been made along the way fade into imperceptibility. 
An example of technology taking a common sense place in our 
lives is my choice of a tool with which to write early versions of this 
article. Having grown weary of word processors crashing and 
inconsistent formatting of text, I chose the LaTeX markup 
language. Several colleagues have told me that I was crazy, since 
writing in LaTeX looks more like computer programming than 
word processing and would require a heavy learning curve. One 
person said, “There is a reason everyone uses Word: It’s better!” 
The consensus was that I was defying common sense by forgoing 
the ease of writing in a graphical word processor such as Microsoft 
Word or OpenOffice (See Figure 1). Below, I outline the basis for 
such notions of common sense, arguing that they are essentially 
found in rhetorically constructed notions of Truth.  
clearly as, “If something is served with a fork, and nobody eats soup with 
a fork, then what was served is not a soup” (102). 
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Figure 1: The LaTeX markup language for an early version of this article. 
As noted above, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tytecha point to loci of 
quantity as the justification given by philosophers since Plato for 
their preference for Truth over mere opinion, since Truth is 
“something commanding the assent of all the gods, something 
which should win the assent of all men” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969, 86–7). They base this insightful observation at least in 
part on the following passage from Plato’s Phaedrus: “A moderate 
man does not put himself through this labor [of constructing 
speeches] in order to speak and act in the company of human 
beings, but to put himself in a position of saying what is gratifying 
to the gods” (273e). However, in the modern world Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca describe an attachment to truth that is 
unconditionally bound to the assent of other people, or at least to 
any such assent that can be constructed by the rhetor. Note that this 
is distinct from Aristotle’s use of dialectic to discover first 
principles. In Aristotle’s version, truth exists somewhere, waiting 
for men to discover it. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, truth is 
bound up in how rhetors construct their audiences.  
Similarly, rhetoricians have long argued that facts are the 
constructions of speakers and writers. Poovey describes the ways in 
which the Renaissance innovation of double-entry bookkeeping 
helped move the production of knowledge from speaking to writing 
(Poovey 1998, 29-91). She argues that the writing of the emerging 
mercantile class contributed to a change in what was understood to 
be a fact: “Mercantile writing—both double-entry bookkeeping and 
mercantile accommodation more generally—played a greater role in 
the transition from the old status hierarchy to modern, functionally 
differentiated domains than historians have typically 
acknowledged” (Poovey 1998, 91). Poovey traces this shift to the 
modern reliance on statistics as a tool for understanding the natural 
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world. However, she acknowledges that this shift did not come 
about without philosophical challenges and difficulties: 
As long as one assigned the phenomena of nature—or 
even more questionably an abstraction like the economy 
or society—the kind of prominence that Bacon had done, 
it was impossible to any method except a mathematical 
one for moving from observed particulars to general 
principles (Poovey 1998, 317, emphasis in original). 
Not only are facts drawn from the social and material worlds reliant 
on the ways people write about them for their existence, but the 
shift from hierarchy and taxonomy to statistics and mathematical 
tables enables a transition from deduction to induction. Individual 
details, when observed en masse, can be assembled into an 
understanding of the greater whole. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca reveal a more rhetorical stance 
in their discussion of facts and truths. Indeed, they tend towards 
social construction. For example, they claim that “it is not possible 
[to]…classify this or that concrete datum as a fact” unless “we can 
postulate uncontroverted, universal agreement with respect to it” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 67). Of course, the authors 
do not reject the existence of facts themselves, but rather point to 
the ways that facts emerge amid the various forces of 
argumentation and persuasion. In other words, speakers and 
writers deploy facts that are much like the controversial concept of 
the universal audience in that the “facts” we argue with are 
constructions of our own making. This does not mean that basic 
facts do not exist outside of our argumentation. For example, it is 
fact that water freezes at zero degrees Celsius. But when I deploy 
that fact in an argument, I rely on it as a construction of what I 
assume my audience will grant as a fact. This must be so, because I 
cannot actually know what my audience takes as fact. 
In “Act and Person in Argument,” Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca provide an anecdote that makes clear the tenuousness of 
even seemingly self-evident facts. They relate a tale from John 
Locke that illustrates the extent to which well-accepted facts must 
be accommodated to the audience: 
It happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining 
the king of Siam with the peculiarities of 
Holland…amongst other things told him “that the water 
in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so 
hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an 
elephant if it were there.” To which the king replied 
“hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told 
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me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man: but 
now I am sure you lie!” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
1951, 263). 
The Dutch ambassador wrongly assumed he was addressing a 
universal audience as he explained the “fact” of water freezing.  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca make it clear that the 
relationship between the universal audience and rhetorical facts is 
always an intimate one: “The way in which the universal audience is 
thought of, and the incarnations of this audience that are 
recognized, are thus determining factors in deciding what, in a 
particular case, will be considered a fact” (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1969, p. 67). To put this in the proper context, it is crucial to 
bear in mind that the universal audience as conceived by Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca is itself a construction of the author, thus 
certainly any “concrete datum” held as fact by the audience must 
also be a construction.5 In this way, the emergence of facts can be 
seen as the result of dialectical tension between the rhetor and the 
audience. But since both speaker and listener are rhetorical 
constructions, all of the tension is internal to the rhetor him or 
herself. 
However, this is not a process of arguing to determine what the 
facts are. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca: “A fact loses 
its status as soon as it is no longer used as a possible starting point, 
but as the conclusion of an argumentation” (Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 68). Note that this flies in the face of 
Aristotle’s observation that facts are not generally the subject of 
arguments (Rhetoric 1.4, 1359a40-1359b2). As far as Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca are concerned, we most certainly can argue about 
facts, but if we do, the facts lose their facticity. In this, Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca are much closer to Latour and Woolgar (1986, 
see especially pages 151-186), who come to a similar conclusion 
regarding the status of scientific facts. In other words, arguing 
about what counts as a fact is not the same as arguing about the 
facts of a particular case. The latter is simply an exercise in figuring 
out which facts to pay attention to and which ones to ignore. The 
former plays a role in determining whether a datum (e.g., the 
freezing point of water or the number of planets in the solar system) 
counts as a fact at all. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca divide those things that have 
gained traction as facts into two groups: “Accepted facts may be 
5 In this way the Universal Audience is just like any other audience (a 
la Ong (1975)). 
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either observed facts—this is perhaps the case for most premises—
or supposed, agreed facts, facts that are possible or probable” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 68). The authors also 
provide a helpful connection between facts and truths: “The term 
‘facts’ is generally used to designate objects of precise limited 
agreement, whereas the term ‘truths’ is preferably applied to more 
complex systems relating to connections between facts” (68–9). 
Thus even those things commonly understood as “Truths” in reality 
are built on a foundation of context-specific rhetorical moves and 
constructed audiences seen as universal by the speaker. 
Locus 4: The Universal Audience 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s universal audience provides a 
fourth theoretical place to aid in the creation of epistemic common 
sense. The concept of the universal audience has long been 
controversial. For example Ede criticizes the concept for its 
apparent reliance on the rationality of the audience, while Gross 
and Dearin dispute this weakness, since rationality, like the 
universal audience itself, remains a construction of the speaker 
(Ede 1989; Gross and Dearin 2003, 31-42). Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca claim that the universal audience  
refers of course…not to an experientially proven fact, but 
to a universality and unanimity imagined by the speaker, 
the agreement of an audience which should be universal, 
since, for legitimate reasons, we need not take into 
considerations those which are not part of it (Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 31).  
Clearly, this statement will ring critical alarm bells among post-
modern readers. However, the concept of the universal audience 
need not be read as a permission slip to exclude members from 
audiences. Instead, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s project is a 
twentieth century attempt to update notions and sensibilities drawn 
from classical rhetoric; it seems unfair to criticize a modern project 
for its inherent modernity.  
More recently, Loïc Nicolas sees the relationship that the 
universal audience creates between the speaker and his or her 
constructed audience as a helpful point of transaction between 
rhetoric and dialectic: 
I believe that this idea [i.e., the Universal Audience] 
gives meaning to the parallel between rhetoric and 
dialectic. Addressing the universal audience amounts to 
debating with oneself, that is, to undergo the necessary 
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trial of contradiction and justification allowing for no 
possible loophole” (Loïc Nicolas 2011, 52).  
That said, it seems clear that the rhetorical concepts outlined above 
rest on a foundation of perceived common sense. Indeed, one 
function of rhetoric is to reinforce that very foundation.  
Locus 5: Social Imaginaries 
A fifth locus of change that helps us identify differences between 
ancient and modern rhetoric offers an understanding of what 
constitutes common sense that helps explain those aspects of the 
social world that depend entirely on the belief and participation of 
many individuals. This is the concept of social imaginaries put forth 
by Charles Taylor. In “Modern Social Imaginaries,” Taylor suggests 
a way of looking at the ways in which people see themselves 
forming and taking part in society (2002). In Taylor’s words, a 
social imaginary is “the ways in which people imagine their social 
existence [and] how they fit in with others” (Taylor 2002, 100). It is 
important to note that this notion is both normative and dialogic. 
For example, Taylor suggests that the economy functions as a social 
imaginary. The economy is normative in that everyone must 
participate in some way—it is exceedingly difficult, if not 
impossible, to opt out completely. However, the economy is also 
affected by the actions and beliefs of all of the people that 
participate in it.  
Taylor provides numerous examples in his book-length 
treatment of the topic, Modern Social Imaginaries (Taylor 2004).  
For example, Taylor points to practices such as democratic elections 
as relying on social imaginaries: 
Part of the background understanding that makes sense 
of our act of voting for each one of us is our awareness of 
the whole action, involving all citizens, each choosing 
individually but from among the same alternatives, and 
the compounding of these microchoices into one 
binding, collective decision (Taylor 2004, 24). 
The validity of such choices relies on “our ability to identify what 
would constitute a foul: certain kinds of influence, buying votes, 
threats, and the like” (Taylor 2004, 24). In other words, the certain 
norms must be met in order for the election to count as an election.  
The same can be said of other kinds of collective action, such as 
public demonstrations. Taylor argues that the very act of deciding 
to demonstrate for or against something “means that this act is 
already in our repertory. We know how to assemble, pick up 
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banners, and march” (Taylor 2004, 26). Those participating in 
something they know as a demonstration also have a sense of the 
physical boundaries implicit in the action, as well as what kinds of 
acts constitute a level of aggression that is too violent. In other 
words, if a demonstration crosses certain thresholds of space and 
violence, it ceases to be a demonstration and becomes something 
else—perhaps a riot. 
Taylor maintains that social imaginaries are different from 
theories in that the former are “the [ways] ordinary people ‘imagine’ 
their social surroundings. … [This] is often not expresses in 
theoretical terms; it is carried in images, stories, and legends” 
(Taylor 2002, 100). Social imaginaries are necessarily “shared by 
large groups of people, if not the whole society”; theories belong to 
an elite few (106). Nevertheless, theories do inform social 
imaginaries—by being taken up by other elites so that eventually 
even whole societies may believe in a theory, to the extent that it 
becomes part of “that common understanding that makes possible 
common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy” (106).  
Although Taylor does not attempt to tie these notions to rhetoric 
in any explicit way, his focus on social imaginaries as informed by 
images, stories, and legends clearly helps align social imaginaries 
with rhetorical perspectives. For example, the “stories, images, and 
legends” of Taylor’s social imaginaries are much the same as 
Aristotle’s belief that human wisdom could be “preserved, if only 
partially, in the form of sayings, maxims, and myths” (Haskins 
2004, 6)—in other words, through endoxa. Note also that Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca point to similar means for creating the 
communion that is crucial to epideictic rhetoric, a concept which I 
discuss in greater detail below. Additionally, Taylor’s focus on the 
practices of participants further strengthens the ties between social 
imaginaries and rhetorical analysis. 
It is worth noting that beyond simply being the stories we tell 
ourselves about society, social imaginaries are normative at their 
core. As Taylor puts it: “We have a common sense of how things 
usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they ought to 
go” (Taylor 2002, 106). It is this aspect of telling us how things 
ought to be that connects social imaginaries with enthymemes, as 
demonstrated by Walton’s example of enthymeme (i.e., “If 
something is served with a fork, and nobody eats soup with a fork, 
then what was served is not a soup” [Walton 2001, 102]).   
Another example can be drawn from a recent Canadian bill that 
makes it illegal to wear a mask at a riot. As reported by the CBC, 
this bill “bans the wearing of masks during a riot or unlawful 
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assembly and carries a maximum 10-year prison sentence” 
(Fitzpatrick 2013, n.p.).  The Canadian Member of Parliament (MP) 
who wrote the bill was cited as arguing that the measure would 
protect the public. The MP also claimed that the bill did not infringe 
upon civil liberties and would actually “help protect the legitimate 
right to protest because it will help prevent legitimate protesters 
from infiltrating a peaceful event and causing trouble” (Fitzpatrick 
2013, n.p.). This position might be restated enthymematically, as 
“People who wear masks at protests must have violent intent, 
therefore we should not allow masks at protests.” 
An advantage of the concept of social imaginaries is that it lacks 
the ironclad inescapability of similar concepts such as ideology 
especially as expressed by Louis Althusser (2001). Social 
imaginaries as conceived by Taylor exhibit something of the quality 
of dialectic itself.  People shape the practices that shape them. In 
this sense, social imaginaries such as the economy, democratic 
elections, or popular demonstrations can be viewed in much the 
same way as discourse itself.  
Citing Anthony Giddens, Norman Fairclough calls this “the 
notion of ‘duality of structure’ ” (Fairclough 2010, 38). 
Furthermore, Fairclough urges researchers not to ignore critical 
questions, since this means that power and status will also be 
ignored. Additionally, “the absence of a serious concern with 
explaining norms [will likewise result] in a neglect of power” 
(Fairclough 2010, 48). That is, analysis based solely in description 
will fall short of understanding the actions connected to and 
resulted from the use of language. It will not be able to account for 
the ethical implications of rhetoric. To guard against this neglect, 
Fairclough suggests researchers look for ways in which discourse 
shapes ideology. He calls such interactions between discourse and 
ideology “ideological-discursive formations” (30). Ideological-
discursive formations (IDFs) work to “‘naturalize’ ideologies, i.e., to 
win acceptance for them as non-ideological ‘common sense’ ” (30). 
Fairclough further argues that “naturalized ideologies and practices 
become part of the ‘knowledge base’…and hence the ‘orderliness’ of 
interaction may depend on them” (Fairclough 2010, 37). 
Furthermore, this “micro” orderliness in turn comes to depend on 
“an achieved consensus in respect to ideological positions and 
practices” (37). In other words, the small ways in which we 
communicate perpetuate ideologies that are generated by social 
groups or classes, but which appear to be due to human nature. In 
essence, the relationship between ideology and discourse is 
dialogic, and this relationship is created and maintained by IDFs. 
Fairclough makes it clear that this duality applies to people as well 
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as their ideologies: “In preferring ‘subject,’ I am emphasizing that 
discourse makes people, as well as people make discourse” (41).6 
Therefore, despite being essentially normative, due to their 
inherent dialogic nature, social imaginaries can be changed by the 
words and practices of people that participate in them. 
Finally, it is important to note that the Taylor’s social 
imaginaries are essentially recursive. As Taylor puts it, “The social 
imaginary is not a set of ideas; rather it is what enables, through 
making sense of, the practices of society” (Taylor 2002, 91). An 
example of this recursiveness can be found in Habermas’ 
description of the public sphere’s use of political power to write 
constitutions to further stabilize its political power (Habermas 
1991). Such documents re-inscribe themselves every time they are 
obeyed. Christopher Kelty extends and explicates this concept of 
recursiveness in his work on the practices that the free and open 
source software community used to understand and enable itself 
and its work (Kelty 2008). He describes a recursive public as “a 
public constituted around the technical and moral ideas of order 
that allow them to associate with one another” (Kelty 2008, 27). It 
is important to note that for Kelty, a recursive public is more than a 
community and the discourse it creates about itself. Kelty’s 
definition insists on the inclusion of the technical structure that 
enables the making and modification of the community itself (Kelty 
2008, 50). The technical structures that enable systems of in-
novation such as the patent system or open source software would 
thus fall under the purview of a recursively constituted social 
imaginary. However, it is clear that such structures and any social 
imaginaries they enable would amount to nothing without a 
community of people to make use of and participate in them.  
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric offers the 
concept of “rhetorical communion,” which is one way speakers and 
writers participate in the creation and maintaining of the 
communities that are a prerequisite for social imaginaries. Graff 
and Winn provide a thorough analysis of this kind of communion 
(as well as Kenneth Burke’s anticipatory notion of 
“consubstantiality”). Graff and Winn make clear that the sense of 
communion established by perhaps seemingly small instances of 
epideictic language is essential to the forming and maintaining of 
community: 
6 Although Fairclough is concerned with analyzing discourse, 
Berkenkotter and Huckin (1994) extend this concept to genre analysis. 
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Acknowledging that every political community will 
consist of individuals and groups with competing 
interests and values, Perelman points to the sense of 
Communion cultivated in epideictic discourses as the 
factor that enables the community to confront or 
transcend internal divisions that threaten to fracture it 
(Graff and Winn 2011, 111).  
Thus, communion is “in this its primary sense a…sociological 
notion” carrying with it ideas of “shared values as a source of social 
rapport and cohesion” that Perelman’s mentor Dupreel also held 
dear (Graff and Winn 2011, 109).  
In this sense, communion is also closely connected to less 
rhetorical concepts such as solidarity: 
The values promoted in any particular epideictic speech 
are presumed to command the assent of the audience 
addressed by the discourse, and as such, the discourse 
fosters a sense of solidarity or communal spring among 
the members of the audience who share those values 
[citing The New Rhetoric, pp. 48–53]. ‘Communion’ is 
the term Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca introduce to 
name this solidarity” (Graff and Winn 2011, 109).  
Graff and Winn argue that this is essentially a “constitutive 
function for rhetoric,” in the sense described by Maurice Charland 
(Graff and Winn 2011, 122; Charland 1987).  Charland argues that a 
constitutive approach to rhetoric creates implications for an 
audience that are impossible in a theoretical approach focused on 
persuasion. Persuasion as a theoretical cornerstone “implies the 
existence of an agent who is free to be persuaded” (Charland 1987, 
133).7 Constitutive rhetoric on the other hand is concerned with the 
role that rhetoric plays in creating audiences as such. In other 
words, this is a rhetoric that a community uses to construct itself—
not just to convince or persuade itself or some of its members.  
Although Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see communion as 
largely related to epideictic discourse, Graff and Winn argue that 
epideictic itself can be oriented towards the future rather than 
focusing solely on the present, as Aristotle would have it in The 
Rhetoric (1.3,1358b16-20). As Graff and Winn put it: “Epideictic, 
though celebrating values in the present, is oriented toward the 
future. The Communion it fosters is anticipatory and preparatory” 
(Graff and Winn 2011, 110). 
7 Note that Charland relies on Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives for his 
theoretical basis.  
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Finally, Graff and Winn point to three major methods for 
establishing communion, as described in The New Rhetoric: 
 
1)   Maxims and proverbs, which are centered on the values     
of the audience; 
2) Allusion and quotation, which are also focused on values; 
 
3) Inviting the audience to participate, which Graff and 
Winn suggest does not necessarily involve the values of 
the audience (114).  
 
For the third method, Graff and Winn point to methods such as the 
oratorical question, but it is clear from the discussion of 
enthymeme above that unstated premises or conclusions can also 
be seen as an invitation to participate—especially in discursive 
situations that do not involve direct interaction with the audience. 
As noted, the first two methods rely on the supposed values of the 
audience being addressed. 
Common Sense and Technology in Aristotle 
We have moved through five loci of change that mark shifts 
between classical and modern epistemologies and how these 
changes affect rhetorical theory. However, in order to answer 
Fairclaugh’s challenge and move from description into critique, it is 
necessary to look for the implications of these changes for the lives 
of people. One result of this shift is the modern relationship that 
people have with their technology. Later in this article, I will draw 
largely from the work of philosopher Andrew Feenberg (2002). But 
before moving to Feenberg’s critical theory, it is necessary to revisit 
Aristotle once more in order to see how he himself dealt with the 
imperfectly recognized historicity of the relationship between 
technology and common sense. Following Lunsford and Ede’s 
advice not to read The Rhetoric in isolation, I turn to the Politics to 
explore this topic. 
In Book I of the Politics, Aristotle provides a largely teleological 
view of technology: “Everything is defined by its function and its 
capacity, and if it is no longer the same in these respects, it should 
not be spoken of in the same way, but only as something similarly 
termed” (Aristotle Politics 1.3.1253a23-25). In other words, an 
object can be defined by what it is supposed to do (its function) and 
how well it does it (its capacity). Aristotle applies this teleological 
definition of technology and to questions involving how and to what 
degree technology supports existing social structures. 
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In fact Aristotle saw clearly the potential new technology had to 
upset one of the social institutions that enabled his society to 
function: slavery. 
Every subordinate, moreover, is an instrument that 
wields many instruments, for if each of the instruments 
were able to perform its function on command or by 
anticipation, as they assert those of Daedalus did, or the 
tripods of Hephaestus (which as the poet says “of their 
own accord came to the gods’ gathering”), so that 
shuttles would weave themselves and picks play the lyre, 
master craftsmen would no longer have need for 
subordinates, or masters for slaves (Aristotle Politics 
1.4.1253a32-1254a1). 
Note that from Aristotle’s point of view, the idea of automatic 
machines that could free slaves from their toil was dystopic; he 
believed that most slaves were slaves because it was in their 
essential nature to be slaves: “That same persons are free and 
others slaves by nature, therefore, and that for these [i.e., those who 
are slaves by nature] slavery is both advantageous and just, is 
evident” (Politics 1.6.1255a1-3). In other words, since slavery is an 
essential role for some people, machines that eliminate the need for 
those slaves would take away an essential part of their being.  For 
Aristotle it was literally common sense to limit the incursions of 
technology into society.   
Compare now Aristotle’s vision of technology run amok with 
Langdon Winner’s Autonomous Technology (Winner 1978). Like 
Aristotle, Winner was concerned with the consequences of a 
technological world that was becoming more and more automated. 
The result of automation in Winner’s account would be to make 
humans subject to technology. As divergent as these two visions of 
autonomous technology are, they are the same in a crucial way: 
Both are concerned with the social ramifications that come along 
with technological advancement. However, whereas Aristotle 
worried that large-scale technological innovation would free the 
slaves, Winner’s concern is that technology is making slaves of us 
all.  
Feenburg’s critical theory of technology recommends itself, in 
the first instance, because of how it deals with this question. 
Although he would obviously disagree with Aristotle’s conclusions 
regarding technology and slavery, Feenberg does take a similar 
methodological approach to Aristotle; both offer a teleological 
approach to technology. For Feenberg this approach stems from the 
need to “[distinguish] between the critique of natural science and 
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the critique of technology” (Feenberg 2002, 174). To help make this 
distinction clear, Feenberg suggests investigating the outcomes of 
technology. By taking a teleological approach to the impacts that 
technologies have on people, communities, and the environment, 
one can apply a critical lens to technology. In the following section, 
I argue that rhetoric provides one entryway into such a critical 
approach to technology. 
Changes in the Relationship between Rhetoric 
and Technology 
I have discussed five loci of change in the pages above. I argue that 
these changes illustrate a shift in the relationship between rhetoric 
and truth.  More recently, these loci have helped reveal the nature 
of the range of possible relationships between humans and tech-
nology. In this section I hope to shed further light on this 
relationship. Some definitions of technology enable us to see the 
relation between common sense and technology clearly, while 
others obscure it. I find helpful those definitions that also show how 
rhetoric figures in mediating the relationship between common 
sense and technology. I will proceed by attempting the deceptively 
difficult exercise of defining technology and by examining 
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology in particular. 
An Excursion Defining Technology  If any attempt to flesh out the 
relationship between rhetoric and technology is to be successful, it 
is necessary to define the term “technology.” In the age of smart 
phones and tablet computers, it may be tempting to think of 
technology as nothing more than the shiny device with a bright 
screen that you hold in your hand and use to post pictures of your 
dog to Facebook. However, even this tongue-in-cheek example 
points to greater complexity. The actual device you hold can do 
nothing without a long history of software development, systems 
and networks of mineral extraction to provide cobalt for the battery, 
and vastly complex interactions between telephone networks and 
the Internet—and this just scratches the surface of the social and 
technical systems required to make these devices work. Below I 
attempt to construct a working definition for technology that 
respects this complexity from a number of diverse scholars.  
Thomas Hughes sees technology as a “creative process involving 
human ingenuity” (Hughes 2004, 3), and later as a “creative means 
to a variety of ends” (5). In other words, technology is the way 
humans deal with the material world. By focusing on the ends of 
technology, Hughes makes it clear that technology cannot be con-
sidered in isolation from the effects that it has on the social and 
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material worlds—on people and the environment. By way of 
comparison, Winner views technology as composed of a variety of 
sub-components. In this definition, technologies can be broken 
down into apparatuses such as individual tools or weapons, 
techniques (that is, skills, crafts and other human activities), 
organizations, which Winner defines as technological social 
arrangements, and networks, that is, “large scale systems[s] that 
[combine] people and apparatuses linked across distances” (Winner 
1978, 12). Like Winner, Hughes notes that machines can be 
connected into systems, but adds that systematization is often 
thought of as a dehumanizing force—think urban planning—while 
networks denote hope and human connections—think Vannevar 
Bush’s vision for the Memex device (Hughes 2004, 97). 
To help shed light on the difference between a technology and a 
machine, it is useful to turn to Bruno Latour and Lewis Mumford. 
Latour describes a machine as a device that holds otherwise 
disparate forces together: “This makes a machine different from a 
tool which is a single element held directly in the hand of a man or a 
woman. Useful as tools are they never turn Mr or Mrs Anybody into 
Mr or Mrs Manybodies!” (Latour 1987, 129). Similarly, Mumford 
claims that the first machine was the bow and arrow, which is the 
first human-made device to do more than simply extend the 
function of an existing organ (such as a club extending the function 
and force available in the naked human hand). Mumford also 
describes the systems of human capital and control used to build 
the pyramids as a “megamachine,” which he justifies as more than 
just an “idle play on words” (Mumford 1967, 191). “If a machine be 
defined…as a combination of resistant parts, each specialized in 
function, operating under human control, to utilize energy and to 
perform work, then the great labor machine was in every respect a 
genuine machine” (191).  
Feminist scholars such as Judy Wajcman point to the intrinsic 
connection between technology and human knowledge in order to 
show eventually how gendered technology has always been:  
“technology” is a form of knowledge….Technological 
“things” are meaningless without the “know-how” to use 
them. That know-how often cannot be captured in 
words. It is visual, even tactile, rather than simply verbal 
or mathematical. But it can also be systemized and 
taught, as in the various disciplines of engineering 
(Wajcman 1991, 14).  
Wajcman notes the close connection between technology and 
action: “‘Technology’ also refers to what people do as well as what 
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they know…. A computer without programs and programmers is 
simply a useless collection of bits of metal, plastic and silicon” (14–
15).  
Wajcman further describes the realm of technology as one that 
has traditionally been dominated by men and as a result by male 
values: “As with science, the very language of technology, its 
symbolism, is masculine. It is not simply a question of acquiring 
skills, because these skills are embedded in a culture of masculinity 
that is largely coterminous with the culture of technology” 
(Wajcman 1991, 19). Wajcman is concerned with barriers that have 
prevented women from participating in the creation, shaping and 
steering of technology. However, she notes that mere access is no 
solution, due to fundamental disconnects between technology that 
has been dominated by male values and the potential for a truly 
‘feminist’ technology—one that sees an elimination of patriarchy as 
an engineering goal of technology itself. In this sense, a feminist 
approach to technology would likely resemble the technological 
holism described by Feenberg (2002). Wajcman’s insight is quite 
clear, especially in light of a rhetorical dispute such as “The Patent 
Wars”—the very label implies contestation and violence as well as a 
set of shared values and beliefs, set against technological and 
economic systems that favor “winners” over “losers” and tend to 
disregard value systems that do not align well with this perspective.  
Taking into account all of these sources, I offer the following 
definition of technology: 
Systems that involve creative combinations of tools, machines, 
processes, and/or people that are connected by networks with the 
purpose of making, creating, or changing things in the social and 
material worlds.  
By combining the devices with their effects on the world, this 
definition calls for ethical considerations of technology. By this I 
mean that technology cannot be seen as an ethically neutral tool. As 
I have argued above rhetoric and technology have always been 
closely connected, even if people have not always seen those 
connections. But there also exists a rhetoric of technology. Charles 
Bazerman offers the following definition for this concept:  
[A rhetoric of technology] is the rhetoric that 
accompanies technology and makes it possible—the 
rhetoric that makes technology fit into the world and 
makes the world fit with technology. There is a dialectic 
between rhetoric and the material design as the 
technology is made to fit the imaginably useful and 
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valuable, to fit into people’s understanding of the world 
(Bazerman 1998, 385). 
Bazerman’s definition highlights once more the close, two-way 
relationship between rhetoric and technology—dialectic in 
Aristotle’s terms, duality of structure in Fairclough’s or Taylor’s. By 
paving a road between people and technology, rhetoric plays an 
important role in transferring human values into technological 
creations and vice versa.  
Values and Technology  Technology is imbued with the values of 
the people that create it. Feminist scholars of technology have been 
aware of this for some time. For example, Wajcman discusses the 
technological architecture of the home as one that “uniquely 
revealing about prevailing social relations and norms of household 
organization” (Wajcman 1991, 110). The Victorian desire for a 
separation of the sexes and privacy (especially for the ‘Master’ of 
the house) gave way to more open architecture that—at least in 
theory—implied families that would share in the work of the home. 
Wajcman describes similar instances of values being laden into 
urban transportation infrastructure that favors the (traditionally) 
male bread-winner and his commute to work (pp. 126–135). 
Similarly, in her investigation into the absence of women from 
historical accounts of technical writing, Katherine Durack (1997) 
points to a crucial misstep in the way previous histories have viewed 
technology and women:  
The problem with regard to adding women to our 
disciplinary history lies in the assumption that 
technology, work, and workplace are gender-neutral 
terms. … But as the work of feminist historians and 
scholars demonstrate, such terms represent contested 
ground (Durack 1997, 250). 
It is in these areas of contestation that values become embedded in 
technology. 
Similarly, values are being designed into the size, shape, and 
design of mobile technologies.8 Addressing such values is the 
central task that Feenberg (2002) has set out for himself. In the rest 
of this section, I outline three of Feenberg’s core concepts: 
instrumentalism (which is essentially the notion that technology is 
8 For example, it seems an unlikely coincidence that the size and shape 
of a cell phone is about the same size and shape as a man’s billfold—a 
form factor that potentially trades ease of use in order to easily fit in a 
pocket. 
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a neutral tool), substantivism (often described as technological 
determinism), and Feenberg’s own critical theory.  
The Instrumental Theory of Technology and Values  Instrumental 
theory is the belief that technologies are nothing more than neutral 
tools, which people use to do whatever they will. Andrew Feenberg 
argues that this common-sense approach is the “most-widely 
accepted view of technology” (Feenberg 2002, 5). Furthermore, 
Feenberg argues that instrumentalism rests on the following five 
assumptions: 
1) Technology is neutral in the same way that any 
“instrumental means” is neutral, and that technology is 
“indifferent to the variety of ends” it can be directed 
towards (2002, 5).  
2) In addition to being indifferent to its outcomes, 
“technology…appears to be indifferent with respect to 
politics” (6). That is, discussions regarding the public 
good have little or no bearing on discussions of tech-
nological progress. The only place where the barrier 
between politics and technology is permeable involves 
discussions of cost.  
3) Technology is deemed neutral because of its “‘rational’ 
character” (6). In other words, since science is seen as the 
product of a rational process, uncovering knowable things 
about the material world, technology—which is science 
applied to the material world—must also be neutral.  
4) Technology is deemed neutral because of its “‘rational’ 
character” (6). In other words, since science is seen as the 
product of a rational process, uncovering knowable things 
about the material world, technology—which is science 
applied to the material world—must also be neutral.  
5) Technology is seen as neutral because it “stands 
essentially under the very same norms of efficiency in any 
and every context” (6). If the focus is on measurements of 
efficiency, other ways of evaluating the effects of 
technology drop to the wayside. Social, cultural, and 
environmental costs (and benefits) are much harder to 
measure in terms of efficiency.  
Although Feenberg’s five points give an extremely helpful analysis 
of an instrumental view of technology, I believe that 
instrumentalism’s most defining (and most insidious) feature is its 
connection to self-evidence or common sense. Instrumentalism is at 
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the heart of slogans such as “Guns don’t kill people; people kill 
people.” While this is true, it is also true that people build guns that 
kill other people. Instrumentalism makes it all too easy to gloss over 
this. 
The Substantive Theory of the Technology and Values Substantive 
theory, on the other hand, places agency in technology itself: “Sub-
stantive theory…argues that technology constitutes a new cultural 
system that restructures the entire social world as an object of 
control” (Feenberg 2002, 6–7). Under substantivism, technology 
becomes more than one cultural factor among many that define the 
course of human development—it becomes the most important 
factor. The illogical but often fantasized conclusion of this argument 
is that technology will become autonomous and will ultimately 
control people as the means to fulfill its (i.e., technology’s) own 
ends. Nightmarish scenes from any number of science fiction 
movies have envisioned the results. 
A less imaginative but more realistic version of this theory can 
be found in Autonomous Technology, in which Winner describes 
the current state of Western technology as a conduit, “such that no 
matter which aims or purpose we decide to put in, a particular kind 
of product inevitably comes out” (Winner 1978, 278). Feenberg 
offers a relatively mundane example as illustration: As fast food has 
replaced the nightly practice of sitting down with family for dinner, 
“the unity of the family, ritually affirmed each evening, no longer 
has a comparable locus of expression” (2002, 7). This is not to say 
that fast food causes a decline in family life, but the correlation and 
mutual interaction between the two factors (that is, the rise of a 
technologically-based daily life and the simultaneous decline in 
family life) is significant. Feenberg reiterates that the substantive 
theory does not necessarily consider technology as run amok: “The 
issue is not that machines have ‘taken over,’ but that in choosing to 
use them, we make many unwitting commitments” (2002, 7). These 
commitments add up, amounting to a kind of technological 
determinism, in which technology determines the shape of society 
(and not the other way around). 
Interestingly, there is a measure of ‘common-sense’ in 
substantive theory as well—when people speak of ‘the march of 
progress,’ they are often invoking a substantive view of technology. 
The implication is that technology will move forward in the 
direction that it has chosen, and people can only follow along or get 
out of the way.  
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Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology and Values  Feenberg’s 
critical theory of technology requires that technology be thought of 
not as a thing, but rather as “an ‘ambivalent’ process of 
development suspended between different possibilities” (Feenberg 
2002, 15). It is important to note that this ambivalence is not the 
same thing as neutrality: “This ambivalence of technology is 
distinguished from neutrality by the role is attributes to social 
values in the design, and not merely the use of, technological 
systems” (Feenberg 2002, 15). Note that this definition of 
technology is similar to the definition offered by Hughes who sees 
technology as a “creative process involving human ingenuity” and 
as a “creative means to a variety of ends” (Hughes 2004, 3, 5). The 
key parts of these two definitions overlap; technology is a process 
aimed at ‘ends’ in Hughes’ definition and at ‘possibilities’ in 
Feenberg’s. The goal of critical theory is to carefully deconstruct 
and evaluate technology and its relationship to those 
ends/possibilities, under the assumption that technology is a 
cultural construct shaped by the values and attitudes of the people 
that create it. Feenberg summarizes this relationship nicely: 
“Technology is a two-sided phenomenon: on the one hand, there is 
the operator, on the other, the object. Where both operator and 
object are human beings, technical action is an exercise of power” 
(16). By considering roles that technology plays in reconstituting 
relationships among people and things, Feenberg’s theory makes it 
possible to account for the social and cultural values involved in the 
production of technology. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle’s descriptions of endoxa and enthymeme, as well as 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notions of community and the 
Universal Audience, provide a solid foundation for understanding 
how rhetoric and texts work to create an aura of common sense. 
That common sense includes our understanding of technology. The 
philosophical work of Taylor and Feenberg provides helpful tools 
for teasing out the ways in which technology becomes “naturalized” 
into our lives—how it becomes invisible. This apparent invisibility 
arises not from anything inherent in the technology itself, but from 
the rhetoric of that technology—and how that rhetoric works to 
accommodate people to the technology. Indeed, in many ways, 
creating a sense of what is common is what rhetoric is all about.  
Only modern rhetorical theorists could have seen this. Aristotle 
could not.   
Copyright © 2013 Joshua Welsh 
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